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Abstract
Phenomenalist Dogmatist Experientialism (PDE) holds the following thesis: if S has
a perceptual experience that p, then S has immediate prima facie evidential justication
for the belief that p in virtue of the experience's phenomenology. The benets of PDE
are that it a) provides an undemanding view of perceptual justication that allows most
of our ordinary perceptual beliefs to be justied, and b) accommodates two important
internalist intuitions, viz. the New Evil Demon Intuition and the Blindsight Intuition.
However, in the face of a specic version of the Sellarsian dilemma, PDE is ad hoc. PDE
needs to explain what is so distinct about perceptual experience that enables it to fulll
its evidential role without being itself in need of justication. I argue that neither an
experience's presentational phenomenology, nor its phenomenal forcefulness can be used to
answer this question, and that prospects look dim for any other phenomenalist account. The
subjective distinctness of perceptual experience might instead just stem from a higher-order
belief that the experience is a perceptual one, but this will only serve to strengthen the case
for externalism: externalism is better suited to provide an account of how we attain justied
higher-order beliefs and can use this account to accommodate the Blindsight Intuition.
1 Introduction
Does perceptual experience evidentially justify perceptual belief, that is, do we use our expe-
riences as evidence for our beliefs about our surroundings? Although we denitely have the
intuition that perception is one of our fundamental ways of gaining knowledge, the view that
experience evidentially justies perceptual belief, call it `experientialism', is not forced on us by
this intuition. Externalist views are just as capable of accommodating it. Moreover, experien-
tialism faces a challenge posed by Jack Lyons (2009): it must explain how perceptual experience
is able to fulll its evidential role without being itself in need of justication. This is reminiscent
of Sellars' argument against foundationalism (Sellars, 1956), but instead of just repeating the
dogma that only beliefs can evidentially justify beliefs, Lyons actually provides a rationale for
this dogma. On his view, inferred beliefs partly derive their justication not from the premise
beliefs themselves, but from whatever justied them (Lyons, 2009, pp. 74-5). Thus, what pre-
vents experiences (as well as imaginations, desires, etc.) from playing an evidential role is not so
much the fact that they are not beliefs but that they are not themselves justied. Upholders of
experientialism therefore face the challenge of explaining why experiences need not be justied
in order to play their evidential role.
In this paper I discuss the prospects for a specic experientialist view proposed by e.g. James
Pryor (2000; 2004), Michael Huemer (2001; 2007), and Elijah Chudno (2011), which I call `Phe-
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nomenalist Dogmatist Experientialism' (PDE). According to this view, perceptual experiences
act as evidence for belief (this makes it experientialist), having a perceptual experience with
the content that p is sucient for immediate prima facie justication of the belief that p (this
makes it dogmatist), and the phenomenology of perceptual experience accounts for its justi-
catory power (this makes it phenomenalist).1 However, in the face of Lyons' challenge, a more
substantial explanation of the special status of perceptual experiences appears to be needed to
defuse an objection of ad-hoc-ness. Several of these explanations, each appealing to a special
phenomenal property of experience, are considered in detail. I argue that each fails to provide
a plausible candidate for a phenomenal property that is specic to perceptual experience and
not reducible to a higher-order belief. Moreover, it's unclear why certain phenomenal features
would have any epistemic signicance at all. I propose instead that the subjective distinctness
of perceptual experience might just stem from an accompanying higher-order belief that the ex-
perience is perceptual. However, the existence of such a higher-order belief would not help PDE
in any way, although it can be used to strengthen the case for externalism.
2 PDE and the Distinctiveness Problem
Let me begin by briey presenting the several components of PDE. I have dened experientialism
as the view that perceptual experience evidentially justies perceptual belief. Evidential justiers
are justiers that are able to serve as evidence for belief and can be contrasted with non-evidential
justiers, which only contribute to justication without serving as evidence (reliability is a well-
known purported example).2 The constraint of being able to serve as evidence makes it plausible
that evidential justiers must have propositional content, since it is dicult to see how something
without propositional content could serve as evidence for a belief. Evidence must somehow make
a belief probable, or the belief should be inferable from the evidence, and these relations only
seem to make sense if the justier itself has propositional content.3 Anyway, the assumption that
evidential justiers have propositional content will not be a problem here, since I only discuss a
version of experientialism which accepts that experiences have propositional content.
Dogmatism is the view that having a perceptual experience that p is sucient for immediate
prima facie justication of the belief that p. In other words, \if it perceptually seems to you
that p, then you thereby possess some prima facie justication for believing that p" (Chudno,
2011, p. 314).4 Both the immediacy and defeasibility of justication are important aspects of
the view.
Starting with the former notion, according to dogmatism, perceptual justication is immedi-
ate in the sense that it \doesn't rest on any other evidence or justication you have for believing
other propositions" (Pryor, 2000, p. 532). The thought is that perceptual experience can provide
justication for the belief that you have two hands even if you do not have any prior justication
for the belief that you are not a brain in a vat.
1Note that Huemer and Chudno also allow other seemings (e.g. memorial, intuitive) besides perceptual
experiences to play this role.
2See (Lyons, 2008) for more on the distinction.
3Note that Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (2004) think otherwise: they think it is overly restrictive to
exclude experiences and feelings of condence from acting as evidence even if they do not have propositional
content. As it is not necessary to think of experience as evidentially justifying perceptual belief, I believe the
burden of proof is on them to show that non-propositional evidential justication makes sense. Moreover, feelings
of condence might be able to act as evidence only because they are reducible to higher-order beliefs (see section
3 for related considerations).
4Note that I do not present the dogmatist thesis as \necessarily, if it perceptually seems to you that p, then
you thereby possess some prima facie justication for believing that p". Although some dogmatists explicitly
subscribe to this latter thesis (e.g., Tucker, 2010), the necessity claim is left out in the original formulation of the
thesis by Pryor (2000).
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Going on to the latter notion, dogmatism also holds that perceptual justication can be
defeated by additional evidence. This is captured by its claim that perceptual justication is
prima facie: if you have strong evidence against p, or if a reliable source tells you that you
are currently experiencing a visual illusion, then even though your perceptual experience that p
provides you with prima facie justication for the belief that p, your belief that p will still not
be ultima facie justied.
The dogmatist thesis is compatible with several views about what it is about perceptual
experience in virtue of which the thesis is true.5 For instance, a reliabilist dogmatist could hold
that the dogmatist thesis is (contingently) true because the process from perceptual experience
to perceptual belief happens to be reliable. In contrast, a phenomenalist dogmatist holds that
the thesis is true because of the intrinsic phenomenal properties of perceptual experience.
Even if one combines dogmatism with experientialism, thereby holding that perceptual ex-
perience provides immediate prima facie evidential justication for belief, then one could still
be a reliabilist. For instance, one could hold that perceptual experiences constitute the evidence
on which subjects base their perceptual beliefs, and that these beliefs are justied because the
evidence is reliably connected to the truth of the beliefs.6 However, my target here is the phe-
nomenalist version of dogmatist experientialism, the view that perceptual experience provides
immediate prima facie evidential justication for belief in virtue of the experience's phenomenol-
ogy.
Are phenomenal dogmatists like Pryor, Huemer and Chudno really committed to experien-
tialism? Pryor explicitly states that \[...] it would be misleading to call these experiences your
\evidence" for believing p" (2000, p. 519). However, Pryor just wants to convey here that a
subject does not himself reason from the premise \it seems to me that p" to the conclusion \p".
A subject need not have any beliefs about the relation between an experience and the perceptual
belief it justies, even though it is necessary that there is a specic relation between the two:
they need to have the same content. That the experience still works as an evidential justier is
suggested by the following comparison Pryor makes:
Compare: when you have a justied belief that p & q, you are thereby also justied in
believing p. But this justication for believing p does not rest on any awareness you
may have of the fact that you have a justied belief that p & q. You do not need to
be able to appeal to the fact that you have a justied belief that p & q as a premise.
The mere having of a justied belief that p & q is enough for your justication for
believing p to be in place (2000, p. 519).
Just as you do not need to reason from the premise \it seems to me that p" to the conclusion
\p", you also do not need to reason from the premise \I justiably belief that p & q" to the
conclusion \p". All you need for justication of your belief that p is to have the experience that
p, or to have the justied belief that p & q. But the latter case of justication presumably has
to do with the fact that p is deducible from the proposition that p & q, which is a sure sign of
evidential justication.
Moreover, the relation between perceptual experience and belief is supposed to be rational,
not merely causal. Having a perceptual experience with the content that p is supposed to
make it rational for the subject to believe that p, and that is why the subject has prima facie
justication for the belief that p. This comes out more clearly when one considers the notion
of well-foundedness, or doxastic justication, instead of the notion of propositional justication
that we have been working with. Suppose that a subject has the perceptual experience that there
5Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
6See (Comesa~na, 2010) for a version of evidentialist reliabilism that might be compatible with dogmatism.
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is a tomato in front of him. In virtue of having this experience, the subject now has propositional
justication for the belief that there is a tomato in front of him. However, if the subject believes
that there is a tomato in front of him merely because he experienced something red, then his
belief will not be well-founded despite being propositionally justied. The problem is that the
subject did not base his belief on the evidence that made it rational to hold it, i.e., his experience
that there was a tomato in front of him.
So I think it's fair to say that PDE is the position that has been defended by philosophers
like Pryor, Huemer and Chudno. And for good reasons too. In contrast with theories that
require perceptual beliefs to be evidentially justied by other beliefs (about the reliability of one's
own perceptual processes for instance), PDE merely requires that experience itself evidentially
justies perceptual belief. Together with a liberal view about the content of experience (which
holds that experiences can represent kind properties like being a table, or being a snake), this
makes it easy to explain how we are justied in all of our ordinary perceptual beliefs. Moreover,
this justication might even be available to animals and children, as long as they are somehow
capable of basing their beliefs on their experiences in the right way.7
The phenomenalist aspect of PDE further makes it into a full-edged internalist view about
justication, in the sense that we have access to those factors in virtue of which we have justica-
tion for our perceptual beliefs, viz. our perceptual experiences. This provides it, in contrast with
reliabilist versions of dogmatist experientialism, with the means to accommodate two important
internalist intuitions. The rst intuition is that justication remains the same as long as the
experiences remain the same | even if they are misleadingly induced by an evil demon as in
Lehrer and Cohen's (1983) New Evil Demon Scenario (call this the `New Evil Demon Intuition').
The second intuition is that perception cannot grant us any direct justication in the absence
of experience (call this the `Blindsight Intuition').8 Thus, patients with blindsight, who do not
experience anything in a certain region of their visual eld, do not have any direct justication
about what goes on in their blind spot even if they are able to guess correctly.9 As PDE is able
to accommodate both intuitions, and does not fall prey to an obvious over-intellectualization
objection, it certainly appears to be a strong contender for an adequate account of perceptual
justication.
However, there is also some reason to be suspect of PDE. What we wanted was a theory that
could explain how experience is able to evidentially justify our perceptual beliefs, and PDE is
a theory which just claims that experiences can evidentially justify perceptual beliefs { albeit
defeasibly. Now this might not be a problem if there were no reasons to doubt that there is such
an evidential relation between perceptual experience and perceptual belief, but, unfortunately,
those reasons do exist. Take an obvious case of evidential justication, where the belief that p,
together with the belief that if p then q, justies the conclusion that q. The conclusion will only
be justied if the premise beliefs themselves are both justied. This shows that some states with
propositional content can only evidentially justify beliefs if they are themselves justied. On
the other hand, there are also states with propositional content that are not able to evidentially
justify any beliefs, such as imaginations and desires. If I simply imagine that p, or just desire that
7This last condition might actually be problematic. For instance, Huemer says the following about the basing
relation: \when one apprehension, B, is based on another, A, A causes B because A (apparently) logically
supports B" (2001, p. 56). This suggests that a subject needs to recognize, or think he recognizes, that an
experience supports a certain belief for his belief to be based on that experience. And this seems too demanding
for unsophisticated agents.
8A reliabilist dogmatist experientialism would also be able to accommodate this intuition due to the lack of
evidence on the part of the subject. But that view is closed o from the specic reply to the New Evil Demon
Intuition that I sketch in the nal section.
9Note that this does not deny that blindsighters may have indirect justication by inference from what is
happening around the blind spot.
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p, this does not give me any evidential justication for believing that p. Lyons (2009, pp. 74-5),
taking into account the obvious case of evidential justication, explains this fact by claiming that
all evidentially justied beliefs derive their justication from whatever justied the evidence in
the rst place. This means that all evidential justiers must themselves be justied before they
can confer any justication. Since only beliefs appear to be states with propositional content
that are capable of being justied, Lyons concludes that only beliefs can evidentially justify other
beliefs.
Even if one does not agree with Lyons' conclusion, this does amount to a challenge for PDE.
The latter theory has to give an alternative account of the dierence between belief, experience,
desire, and imagination that explains why the rst two are possible evidential justiers, while the
latter two are not.10 Moreover, it has to give an account of what is so special about experience
as an evidential justier that enables it to provide prima facie justication without being itself
justied.11 Call this the distinctiveness problem for PDE. Without an answer to this problem,
PDE would remain an ad hoc view of perceptual justication.
3 Supposed Epistemically Signicant Phenomenologies
3.1 A feeling of seeming to ascertain that p
Most proponents of PDE provide at least some suggestion as to what it is about perceptual
experience that gives it the power to provide evidential justication without being in need of
justication itself. Pryor gives the following answer to the distinctiveness problem:
I think there's a distinctive phenomenology: the feeling of seeming to ascertain that
a given proposition is true. This is present when the way a mental episode represents
its content makes it feel as though, by enjoying that episode, you can thereby just
tell that that content obtains. [...] When you daydream or exercise your visual
imagination, you represent propositions [...], but it does not feel as though you can
thereby just tell that those propositions are true (Pryor, 2004, p. 357).
One problem with Pryor's suggestion is that it's not clear whether the feeling of seeming to
ascertain that a given proposition is true necessarily has to do with the way a mental episode,
like perception, represents its content. Couldn't the feeling arise because of a separate belief
about the mental episode? One candidate for such a belief would be the belief that the mental
episode is veridical: if someone believes that he is veridically perceiving that p (even if he is, say,
imagining that p), then it's no wonder that he also has a feeling of seeming to ascertain that p
is true.
However, this specic suggestion seems to fall prey to the phenomenon of known illusion.12
Even if a subject is well aware, say, that the two lines in the Muller-Lyer illusion are actually of
the same length, the two lines continue to look to be of a dierent length. The feeling of seeming
to ascertain that the lines are of a dierent length does not go away even though the subject
no longer believes that he is veridically perceiving that they are of a dierent length. So it's
implausible that the feeling of seeming to ascertain that p can be explained by an appeal to the
belief that one is veridically perceiving that p.
10Maybe imagination is a possible evidential justier in cases where one imagines that something is the case to
`see' what would happen. However, the cases I'm concerned with are ones in which one simply imagines that p.
11Notice that this latter question is not adequately dealt with by claiming that experiences provide non-
inferential justication, as this does little more than giving a name to the unexplained phenomenon.
12Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to include this problem to clarify my own proposal.
5
Two responses are in order with regard to this objection. First, the fact that a certain higher-
order belief is not necessary for the feeling of seeming to ascertain that p does not show that it
is not sucient for the feeling of seeming to ascertain that p. And the suciency claim already
constitutes a problem for Pryor's proposal. If a higher-order belief that one veridically perceives
that p can give rise to the phenomenology that supposedly explains why a subject has justication
for the belief that p, then there could be situations in which a subject is justied merely because
he has the relevant higher-order belief.13 The higher-order belief that one veridically perceives
that p might be false, or worse, unjustied, but the subject would still be justied because he
would have an experience that p in combination with the relevant phenomenology. Not only is
this prima facie a bad result, it also puts pressure on PDE's claim that perceptual justication
is immediate in the case where one does have justication for the higher-order belief.
Second, one could appeal to dierent beliefs to explain where the feeling of seeming to ascer-
tain that p comes from. For instance, the belief that one currently perceptually experiences that
p, where this should be distinguished from the belief that one currently imagines (or desires, etc.)
that p, does not fall prey to the phenomenon of known illusion. Of course I am not suggesting
that subjects would actually consciously entertain precisely that belief, but later on (section 4) I
will try to make plausible that something like this might be going on unconsciously nonetheless.
3.2 Presentational phenomenology
Chudno (2011, p. 317) agrees that Pryor's account of the special phenomenology of perceptual
experience is somewhat too underdeveloped to work. Chudno explicates Pryor's suggestion
by appealing to an experience's presentational phenomenology, claiming that an experience has
presentational phenomenology with respect to a proposition p \just in case they are experiences
in which we both represent that p [...] and seem to be aware of an item that makes it the case
that p" (Chudno, 2011, p. 321). According to Chudno, it is an experience's presentational
phenomenology that accounts for its justicatory force:
I nd it compelling that if you have an experience that not only represents your
environment as being a certain way, but that is one in which you also seem to be
aware of the very items in your environment in virtue of which it is the case that
your environment is that way, then you thereby have some prima facie justication
for believing that your environment is the way it appears to you to be (Chudno,
2011, p. 322).
The problem with this specic proposal is that it might not provide a satisfying answer
to the distinctiveness problem because it fails to distinguish clearly between imagination and
perception. This becomes prominent when one looks at the specic ways in which Chudno lls
out presentational phenomenology for both perception and intuition. For the case of perception,
Chudno thinks that presentational phenomenology comes down to a combination of \seeming
to fact-perceive that [p]" (2011, p. 319) and \seeming to be sensorily item-aware of an item [that
makes it the case that p]" (ibid.). Similarly, \an intuition experience possesses presentational
phenomenology when in it you both seem to fact-intuit that p and seem to be intellectually item-
aware of an item that makes it the case that p" (Chudno, 2011, p. 323). Then why not claim
that a visualization has presentational phenomenology when in it you both seem to fact-visualize
that p and seem to be imaginatorily item-aware of an item that makes it the case that p?
13Note that this does not deny Pryor's claim that it's not enough for prima facie justication to think you have
the phenomenology (Pryor, 2004, p. 357). I'm envisaging a situation in which a higher-order belief actually gives
rise to the necessary phenomenology.
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Although Chudno agrees that imagination can also have a sort of presentational phenomenol-
ogy, he thinks that there is still an important dierence between imagination and, e.g., perception:
Unlike sensory, intellectual, or self-presentational awareness, objectual imagining is
not a kind of awareness, or seeming awareness. That is, objectually imagining an F
is not a way to seem to be aware of an F . On the face of it, if you seem to be aware
of a tiger, for example, you represent the tiger as actual | it is really there. But you
can objectually imagine a tiger without representing the tiger as actual (Chudno,
2012, p. 62).
The important dierence that Chudno here points to has to do with representing something
as actual. But it is still not clear whether this can denitively distinguish imagination from
perception. Although I agree with Chudno's point that you can objectually imagine a tiger
without representing the tiger as actual, it seems to me that you can also objectually imagine
a tiger and represent it as actual (e.g., by imagining that there actually is a tiger in front of
you at this moment). But surely this imaginatory experience would then still not provide any
prima facie justication for the belief that there is a tiger in front of you. So presentational
phenomenology cannot be sucient for the justicatory force of perceptual experience, given
that there are experiences with presentational phenomenology that do not provide evidential
justication.
3.3 Forcefulness
The last suggestion, that perception represents things as actual, brings us to a distinctive phe-
nomenal property of perceptual experience suggested by Huemer (2001, p. 77): its forcefulness.14
According to Huemer, perceptual experience not only has a certain representational content, it
also presents this content in a certain way, namely as being actualized. Huemer thus makes clear
that the representational content in its entirety is presented as actualized by perception, in con-
trast with (what seemed to be) Chudno's suggestion that an object is represented as actual in
the content itself. This means that the previous counterexample of imagining that there actually
is a tiger in front of you can no longer be used: although in this example the tiger is represented
as actual, the entire content might still not be presented as actualized.
Huemer explains what he means by forcefulness in more detail by contrasting it with what it
is not:
It is not a matter of how faint or vivid an experience is, and it is not a matter of how
detailed and specic its content is. Forcefulness is not a matter of either the qualia
or the representational content of an experience; it is a third aspect of experience.
As to what that aspect is, I have no more to say than [the following]: it is the fact
that, in the experience, it seems to one that something satisfying the content of the
experience actually exists, here and now (Huemer, 2001, p. 79).
As with Pryor's suggestion, we can reasonably ask whether the property of forcefulness is
necessarily connected to perceptual experience. Huemer suggests that it is when he claims that,
because of the forcefulness of perceptual experience, \[...] you would [...] never confuse seeing a
tomato with imagining one" (2001, p. 77; my italics). This is a very strong claim, as it surely
seems possible that a subject somehow confuses seeing a tomato with imagining one. Moreover,
that this possibility is also actual could be supported by appealing to the so-called `Perky eect'.
14Chris Tucker (2010, p. 530) mentions a similar property of `assertiveness', and William Tolhurst (1998, pp.
300-1) talks of the property of `presence'.
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Perky (1910) designed a set-up in which subjects were told to imagine a certain object, like
a banana, book, or leaf, on a surface while a faint image which resembled that object was also
projected (with increasing luminosity) onto the surface. Subjects did not know that an image
was going to be projected, and also denied to have seen a projected image { they claimed they
just imagined everything on the surface. Yet their reports made clear that the projected image
did inuence their experience: some noted that the banana was standing on end, which was
not as they had been supposing they thought of it; some were surprised to imagine an elm leaf
even though they had tried for a maple leaf (Perky, 1910, p. 432). The precise interpretation
of these ndings remains controversial: subjects might have somehow mistaken their perceptual
experiences (of the objects) for imaginations (of those objects), but the imagination could also
have blocked the occurrence of a perceptual experience altogether (Segal and Gordon, 1969).
The former interpretation is clearly at odds with Huemer's claim that you would never confuse
perception for imagination, and this would leave him without an explanation of how this is
possible.
However, the latter interpretation, that imagination interfered to such an extent that no
perceptual experience actually occurred, appears to be the usual one in current psychological lit-
erature.15 Even if this is granted, then it is still surprising that a philosophical theory is a priori
committed to a specic interpretation of the data. Moreover, the precise way in which imagi-
nation is supposed to interfere with perception remains unresolved (Reeves and Craver-Lemley,
2012). Although there might not be a perceptual experience that is confused for an imagina-
tory experience, there might still be some confusion going on at the level of pre-phenomenal
processing.16
Something similar could be said about confusing imaginations with perceptions. Some
have claimed that hallucinations might just be internal mental events, like imaginations, that
are mistaken for genuine perceptions because of a diminished skill in `reality discrimination'
(Johnson et al, 1993; Fish, 2008). Again the idea does not seem to be that subjects consciously
assess their experience and wrongly judge them to be either perception or imagination, but that
there is some unconscious mechanism that somehow ags them as the one or the other. I will
say a bit more about this in section 4.
It is dicult to assess the precise philosophical force of these empirical hypotheses, but a few
things are clear. First, subjects in the Perky experiment lack forceful experiences, while hallu-
cinating subjects have forceful experiences. Huemer would probably accept these consequences
as well, concluding that hallucinating subjects have justication for their beliefs (which Huemer
explicitly endorses and takes to be a virtue of his theory (2001, p. 129)), while subjects in the
Perky experiment lack such justication. Second, the presence or absence of forcefulness in these
examples should not be reducible to a higher-order belief on the part of the subject with the
content that, e.g., the current experience is perceptual. If it were reducible to such a higher-
order belief, then PDE couldn't gain any epistemic mileage out of it: this belief would have to
be justied itself before it could confer any evidential justication, and even if it was justied it
would conict with the supposed immediacy of perceptual justication.
Huemer would certainly agree with this second point, as he holds that forcefulness is a specic
type of seeming (i.e. a seeming that something satisfying the content of the experience actually
exists) and that in general \its seeming to S as if P is a distinct state from S's believing that
P" (Huemer, 2001, p. 99). As it appears implausible to posit a non-belief-like intellectual
15Although this is not so easy to determine, as the `Perky eect' nowadays refers in psychology to the general
interference of imagination on perception. Although it is implausible to explain this general eect by appealing to
confusion of perception with imagination, in a specic instance (viz., the 1910 Perky experiment) this confusion
might still take place.
16Cf.Reeves and Craver-Lemley (2012, p. 7): \An [attractive] alternative hypothesis is that the Perky eect
results from a combination of real and imagined features that makes the real features more dicult to extract."
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seeming that something satisfying the content of experience actually exists in addition to the
perceptual seeming (the perceptual experience) that such-and-so is the case, the best way to
interpret Huemer is to take him as suggesting that there is a phenomenal property of experience,
not reducible to the content of the experience, which conveys that external objects are actually
present. But the problem is that we have been given no explanation at all how this irreducible
phenomenal property of experience (dis)appears in the empirical cases under discussion. So even
in the best scenario, PDE is left with an explanatory challenge.
This is especially pressing because one can give an ontologically simpler explanation of the
relevant phenomena (I elaborate on this explanation in section 4). In the Perky experiments,
subjects do not have any forceful experiences, because they (perhaps unconsciously) believe that
they are imagining instead of perceiving. In the case of hallucination, subjects believe that they
are perceiving whatever it is that they might instead be imagining, and therefore have forceful
experiences. This is an explanation that appeals to higher-order beliefs, instead of supposing the
presence or absence of an extra irreducible phenomenal property to the content of experience.
And if forcefulness indeed comes down to having certain higher-order beliefs, then it is of no help
to PDE.
3.4 General worries about the phenomenalist approach
From the specic discussions of the several phenomenalist answers to the distinctiveness problem
we can distill a general recipe that phenomenalists have to follow to come up with a satisfying
reply. First, the phenomenalist has to clearly describe a phenomenal feature that is specic to
perceptual experience. No other propositional states incapable of evidential justication (e.g.,
desires, imaginations), or incapable of evidential justication without being themselves justied
(beliefs), should have this feature, or else one has not explained where the distinctive justicatory
power of perceptual experience comes from. This rst step is hard enough already, as, for
instance, presentational phenomenology does not entirely seem to t the bill.17
One way in which the rst step might be avoided is by claiming that any mental state,
whether it is a belief, imagination, or perceptual experience, has justicatory power so long as
it has a specic phenomenal feature.18 But this strategy leads to a view that is very dierent
from the original PDE: instead of holding that if it perceptually seems to you that p, you are
immediately prima facie justied in your belief that p, the view now holds that if you are in a
mental state which has property F and content p, then you are prima facie justied in your belief
that p. This lacks PDE's original intuitiveness, and will still need to deal with the following two
steps to answer the distinctiveness problem.
For the second step, the phenomenalist has to show that his preferred phenomenal feature is
not reducible to a (higher-order) belief, and that (higher-order) beliefs are not causally sucient
for the phenomenal feature. If the feature is reducible to a belief of some sort, then this belief
will either be itself unjustied and therefore unable to evidentially justify the perceptual belief,
or justied, but then the justication of perceptual beliefs is no longer immediate. If certain
beliefs are causally sucient for the phenomenal feature, then perceptual justication would be
attainable if one merely had the means of inducing these beliefs | which seems to make percep-
tual justication too easy to obtain, given that the causally sucient beliefs can be completely
unjustied.
17One reviewer pointed out that I have not considered the possibility that there might be experiences that
have the phenomenal feature normally sucient for justicatory power (F), but that also have another feature
(G) which blocks F's making the state into a justier. Although I acknowledge that I have not ruled out this
possibility, I think it is up to the defender of PDE of working out its details to make it into a plausible theory.
18An anonymous referee provided this suggestion.
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Even if these rst two steps are completed, the phenomenalist is not home free yet. Take
whatever phenomenal feature you like, be it a feeling of seeming to ascertain that p, or pre-
sentational phenomenology, or forcefulness, the phenomenalist will still have to show that this
feature is also epistemically signicant. After all, the distinctiveness problem does not just ask
for any specic feature that distinguishes perceptual experience from states like beliefs, desires,
and imaginations. What is needed to answer the problem is a feature that is both specic to
perceptual experience and epistemically signicant. And this remains problematic. Even it phe-
nomenally seems to you that you are aware of all the items that make the currently perceptually
represented proposition true, why should this provide you with justication for believing that
proposition? How could phenomenology somehow add justicatory strength to the represented
propositions? Here the proponent of PDE might claim that explanations have to stop some-
where and that the envisaged justicatory relation between contentful phenomenal experience
and perceptual belief is primitive. However, in the face of relevant externalist alternatives, such
a reply might not do the trick. The externalist can supply an explanation of why, for instance,
the reliability of a belief-forming process is important for justication. Reliability is important
because it makes sure that justied beliefs have some connection to being true, and that is an
important epistemic value. Such a further explanation of the epistemic relevance of phenomenol-
ogy will also be important to provide if one wants to defend the view that the phenomenology
of experience provides it with a distinctive justicatory power, and this remains a third hurdle
to be taken by the proponents of PDE.
4 Distinguishing Perception from Imagination
The above discussion about distinctive properties of perceptual experience does raise the following
two questions: if there is no irreducible phenomenal property specic to perceptual experience,
then, rst, what is it that normally distinguishes perception from imagination, and, second, how
do we distinguish them? Huemer mentions that Hume took the distinctness of perception and
imagination to lie in their respective vivacity: he thought perception to be far more vivid than
imagination. Huemer himself disagrees with this idea: \an exercise of imagination is distinguished
from a perceptual experience chiey by the fact that the object of the latter seems to the subject
to be present then and there, while the object of the former does not seem to exist at all" (2001,
p. 78). Huemer further argues against Hume's theory by saying that someone looking at a faint
photograph of a tomato will never have any temptation to think that he were merely imagining
the photograph. Similarly, Huemer claims that even if you have a vivid, detailed imagination,
or very poor eyesight, you would never confuse imagination and perception (2001, p. 77). Now
I have already questioned the truth of this second claim, but here I want to focus on something
else. Huemer seems committed not only to the claim that there is an irreducible phenomenal
property of forcefulness that distinguishes perception from imagination, but also to the claim
that subjects themselves distinguish their experiences on the basis of their phenomenology. That
is why he emphasizes that subjects would not confuse perception with imagination on the basis
of an absence of vivacity or detailedness. However, the suggestion that we identify an experience
as an imagination on the basis of its phenomenology actually appears somewhat absurd.19 It is
not normally the case that we rst have to examine our own experience before we know it to
be an imagination or a perception. We do not use our experience as evidence for the conclusion
that we are undergoing an imagination. Similarly, we do not have to examine our imagination
to nd out what we are imagining. We normally know that we are imagining, and what we are
19At the end of the day, this is an empirical question, but I contend that it is not even phenomenologically apt
to claim that we usually identify experiences on the basis of their phenomenology.
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imagining, without relying on the phenomenology of the imagination itself. Instead of thinking
that imagination lacks a certain phenomenal property, on the basis of which objects do not
phenomenally seem to exist, I suggest that the correct view is that we normally know that we
are imagining, and on that basis believe that the objects are not really present.
A similar story goes for perception. It certainly seems to be the case that we normally know
that we are perceiving when we are perceiving, without relying on our perceptual experience as
evidence for this knowledge | although one of course could try to do this in certain scenarios
(e.g. when confronted by a skeptic). But if it is correct that we normally know that we are
perceiving and imagining without relying on the perception or imagination itself, then how do
we know this; what justies this knowledge?
Here we must leave the internalist framework of PDE that we have so far been going along
with, and instead commit to an externalist framework. I mentioned already the hypothesis that
imaginations might be mistaken for perceptions because of a diminished cognitive capacity for
reality discrimination. We normally keep tabs on the source of our information, e.g. whether the
source was internal or external, whether it was seen or heard, on the basis of the content and
context of the information (Johnson et al, 1993).20 This activity often happens unconsciously,
although it might become conscious in some cases. Now, if something like this monitoring process
already happens during perception and imagination, this would explain how we come to believe
that we are perceiving or imagining when we are doing so. Our belief that we are perceiving,
or that we are imagining, would then be the output of an unconscious process of information
monitoring. An internalist would be hard put to explain how such a belief could be justied,
given the unconscious nature of the process leading to it. Although one could try to cash this
out in terms of evidence leading to belief, there is no reason to assume that all this \evidence"
is accessible for the subject. And this is what internalism, or at least an access internalism like
PDE, requires for justication. Externalism, on the other hand, has no problem in accounting for
the justication of the higher-order beliefs in question: they are the output of a reliable cognitive
mechanism, and that is sucient for their justication.
The picture I am suggesting is as follows. We do not distinguish perception from imagination
by using the phenomenology of these experiences as evidence, but instead know the experiences
for what they are by means of a reliable cognitive mechanism. Thus, it is ill-suited to look for a
special phenomenal feature of perception on the basis of which I know it to be perception: there
is no such phenomenal feature. The phenomenal distinctiveness of perception and imagination
might just stem from having the respective experiences in combination with having higher-order
beliefs about their nature.
Wouldn't such a proposal fall prey to the phenomenon of known illusion? The phenomenology
of some illusions (like the Muller-Lyer illusion) is the same even if one does not believe in
the veridicality of one's own experiences. However, I am not suggesting that the subjective
distinctness of perceptual experience should be explained by a higher-order belief that one is
currently veridically perceiving that such-and-so is the case. Instead, the relevant higher-order
belief is that one is currently perceiving, in the sense of gaining information from a certain outside
source instead of from an inside source. This belief can be present even if one does not believe
that the current perceptual experience is veridical.21
20There is some evidence that this source-monitoring mechanism is not as reliable in at least some cases of
actual hallucinators, such as schizophrenics and Parkinson's patients (Barnes et al, 2003; Simons et al, 2006).
21The phenomenon of known hallucination might be more dicult to deal with, although it's not obvious that
hallucinatory subjects do not believe that they are perceiving in the relevant sense if they know that they are
hallucinating.
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5 Internalist Intuitions Revisited
Let's suppose it to be correct that we normally have higher-order knowledge of our own expe-
riences by means of some sort of reliable cognitive mechanism. This brings with it one way
for externalists to respond to the earlier mentioned Blindsight Intuition. On the PDE account,
blindsighters are epistemically worse o than regular perceivers because they do not experience
what goes on in their blind spot, even if they are able to guess reliably and correctly. According
to PDE, blindsighters are not directly justied in their guesses because they lack experiential
evidence. In contrast, the standard (non-experientialist) externalist framework seems to have a
problem in accommodating the idea that blindsighters do not have direct justication for their
guesses. Note that blindsighters do not actually believe their own guesses (they think they are
randomly guessing), but let's assume a scenario in which blindsighters trust their guesses and
believe their content even though they do not know whether they are actually reliable.22
If it is true that we normally have higher-order knowledge of the fact that we are perceiving,
then blindsighters are in this respect epistemically worse o than regular perceivers, even on
an externalist perspective. Blindsighters do not know that they are gaining the information
which supports their guesses through the use of their eyes. This already goes some way towards
accommodating the Blindsight Intuition, as it explains why perceivers who enjoy experiences are
epistemically better o than blindsighters. Normal sighters know that they are seeing such-and-
so, in contrast with blindsighers, who are ignorant of the source of their reliable guesses. But
this epistemic dierence does not yet explain why blindsighters' guesses would not be justied
at all.
There are at least two ways to get at this result from a standard externalist perspective,
which both posit a defeater for the justication arising out of the reliable unconscious perceptual
process.23 The rst option is to posit a belief that one was not perceiving that p (where p is a
proposition about something going on in the blind spot), which would then cast doubt on the
truth and justication of p. If one feels that this belief is not sucient to constitute a defeater,
then one might also posit, as a variation on this rst option, the belief that one did not know the
source of the guess that p, or the belief that the belief that p was unreliably formed. Whichever
the precise details, the idea is that the posited beliefs should conict with what a subject himself
believes to be required to have a justied belief.
The second option is to just use the lack of a higher-order belief about e.g., the source of
the guess that p, as a defeater for justication that p. Although this second option is clearly
less cognitively demanding, thus making sure that defeat is not too hard to come by for blind-
sighters, it also has the drawback of making defeat too easy to come by. Just think of cognitively
unsophisticated agents that are unable to form any higher-order beliefs. For them, all per-
ceptual justication would be defeated according to the second option. This makes the rst
option the preferable one. Having the relevant defeating higher-order belief appears demanding
enough to ensure that perceptual justication is not always defeated for unsophisticated agents,
but still easy enough to make sure that the justication is defeated for the more sophisticated
blindsighters.
This proposal does have some surprising consequences for the case of unsophisticated blind-
sighters. As unsophisticated blindsighters do not have any higher-order beliefs, the proposal
would have the consequence that their rst-order perceptual beliefs are justied, despite the lack
22This would make the blindsighters very much like BonJour's (1985) clairvoyant Norman. The dierence is
that blindsighters would surely be justied if they still enjoyed the relevant perceptual experiences, although it is
not so clear that Norman would be justied if he also enjoyed specic clairvoyant experiences.
23I am now outlining two ways that connect to my ideas about higher-order beliefs about perception. One
could also use a dierent way to respond to the Blindsight Intuition by using externalist responses to clairvoyance
objections (see, e.g., Goldman, 1986; Bergmann, 2006; Lyons, 2009).
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of perceptual experience. This might not be such a bad result though. After all, why couldn't
there be creatures that gain perceptual knowledge without having any experiences? The Blind-
sight Intuition seems to be specically about human perceivers, and with the account here we
can explain why: in the absence of experience we acquire defeaters for perceptual beliefs.
Let me make my proposal on behalf of externalism more clear. The thought is that higher-
order beliefs can defeat rst-order beliefs by making them appear unjustied. These higher-order
beliefs need not be justied themselves to become defeaters. Indeed, in the blindsight scenario
the generated higher-order beliefs about the source of one's beliefs might be more often false than
true with regard to a specic domain of beliefs (namely, beliefs about the source of the beliefs
that have to do with what goes on in the blind spot). This would make the cognitive mechanism
responsible for these higher-order beliefs unreliable with regard to this specic domain of beliefs,
and the higher-order beliefs themselves thereby (perhaps) unjustied.24
However, it's not the case that unjustied higher-order beliefs can also confer justication
on rst-order beliefs. A blindsighter does not gain justication for his perceptual beliefs by
randomly adopting the higher-order belief that he is reliably perceiving such-and-so. On the
account I'm proposing then, there is a crucial dierence between higher-order beliefs that act
as defeaters and higher-order beliefs that act as justications: the former need not be justied,
but the latter do.25 This dierent treatment of defeating beliefs and justifying beliefs is not
ad hoc, as it also ts Lyons' account of evidential justication. If we accept the plausible idea
that evidential justication can only take place if the evidential justier itself has justication
to transmit, then this still leaves completely open what to say about defeat.
Even in the face of this explanation of the Blindsight Intuition, internalists might dig in their
heels and maintain that blindsighters lack evidence which normal perceivers do have, namely
certain qualitative experiences. But notice that it is not at all clear that our experiences really
serve as evidence for our beliefs. The Blindsight Intuition does not really amount to that.
Moreover, the contention that we use experience as evidence for perceptual belief in fact appears
to be phenomenologically inadequate. This does not just come down to the claim that we do
not consciously reason from \it seems to me that p" to \p" (recall that Pryor explicitly agrees
with this). It comes down to the phenomenological fact that we are not normally aware of two
dierent mental events, one of experience, and one of belief based on that experience. Normally,
seeing just is believing. We only become aware of a dierence between experience and belief
when we are aware of some sort of defeater, e.g., when we are familiar with the illusory nature of
a certain experience as in the case of the Muller-Lyer illusion. This is no knock-down argument
against the thesis that we do use experience as evidence for belief, but it does show that this is
a substantive philosophical thesis instead of a part of common sense.
Realizing that experience need not act as our evidence for belief might also help in rebutting
the New Evil Demon Intuition. To do full justice to this problem I would need a much longer
discussion, so here I will only point to the connection I have in mind.26 If we think of experience
as our evidence for belief, then it is natural to think that the agents in the New Evil Demon
Scenario have the same evidence, and, therefore, the same justication as we do.27 But once
we accept that experience is just a contingent, non-evidential factor in our way of attaining
perceptual knowledge, then this intuition might subside. In any case it is not so clear whether
24This would depend on whether one holds that justication requires reliability of a process with regard to a
specic domain of beliefs.
25See also (Bergmann, 2005) for such a theory.
26Again, there are also other externalist replies to the New Evil Demon problem (see, e.g., Goldman, 1986,
1988; Comesa~na, 2002; Majors and Sawyer, 2005).
27Although natural, one could also deny even this and hold that the agent in the New Evil Demon scenario
merely thinks that he has the same evidence. This seems to require some form of metaphysical disjunctivism
about perceptual experience (Haddock and Macpherson, 2008).
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the New Evil Demon Intuition supports the thesis that perceptual experience acts as evidence
for belief, or instead follows from a prior commitment to this thesis.
6 Conclusion
Although PDE is an undemanding internalist view of perceptual justication that is capable of
accommodating both the Blindsight and New Evil Demon Intuition, the distinctiveness problem
presents it with a severe explanatory challenge. To overcome an objection of ad-hoc-ness pro-
ponents of PDE have to nd a phenomenal property of experience that is specic to perception,
irreducible to (higher-order) beliefs, and epistemically signicant. I have argued that current pro-
posals do not meet this challenge and that the search for such a property might be misguided,
especially if one assumes that it forms the basis for our discriminations between perceptual and
imaginatory experiences. Instead, I have proposed that we know that we are perceiving when
we are perceiving on the basis of a source-monitoring mechanism, and that an externalist frame-
work is best suited to accommodate this knowledge. Moreover, allowing for higher-order beliefs
also helps externalism to give an alternative account of the Blindsight Intuition: blindsighters
lack justication not because they lack experiential evidence, but because they have higher-order
beliefs that defeat it.
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